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STYLE PIRACY REVISITED 
Safia A. Nurbhai* 
INTRODUCTION 
The fashion industry is an international multi-billion dollar 
business, one in which sales of general merchandise and apparel 
alone were estimated at $784.5 billion dollars in 1999.1 The 
public today is aware of high-end designers from cable stations 
and entertainment shows that center on fashion, as well as from 
various magazines and Internet sites.2 Consumer knowledge of 
high-end fashion spurs the demand for designer products. As a 
result, style piracy—the copying of a designer’s original designs, 
“thereby securing, without expense, the benefit of his artistic 
                                                          
 * Brooklyn Law School Class of 2002; B.A., Lafayette College, 1999. 
The author wishes to thank Professors Leo Raskind and Claire Kelly for their 
advice and guidance. She would also like to thank Murtaza and Scherie 
Nurbhai, Sarah Nurbhai, Yetta Miller, and Kenneth Anand for their love, 
support, and encouragement. In addition, the author wishes to thank ASCAP 
for awarding a version of this note first place in the Nathan Burkan Memorial 
Competition and the NYSBA for awarding a version of this note second place 
in the Intellectual Property Law Section’s Annual Writing Competition. A 
version of this article was originally published in Volume 10, Number 3 of 
Bright Ideas, Winter 2001 edition, a publication of the Intellectual Property 
Law Section of the New York State Bar Association. 
1 Apparel Industry Website, at http://www.activemedia-guide.com/ 
retailing_industry.htm (last visited Mar. 18, 2002). 
2 Television stations such as the Style Channel, Metro TV, and 
Entertainment Television have various shows centered on fashion design. 
Metro TV airs fashion shows twenty-four hours a day during Fashion Week. 
Television shows, such as Access Hollywood and Extra, critique the dresses 
worn by Hollywood stars at awards shows, such as the Oscars. Magazines 
such as Vogue and Cosmopolitan advertise designer fashions in each issue. 
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work”3—has become more popular. In fact, style piracy has 
become “a way of life in the garment business.”4 Copying, or 
“knocking off,” the work of creative designers is “standard 
operating procedure for many [companies] both large and 
small.”5 Not surprisingly, many designers oppose “knocking 
off”6 and continue to seek federal legislation to protect their 
works.7 
Design pirates sometimes use covert methods to uncover what 
other designers are creating.8 “It is not uncommon for design 
pirates to sneak into a designer’s fashion show in Paris (or raid 
the studio’s trash for sketches) and have ‘knock-offs’ available in 
New York the next day.”9 In Johnny Carson Apparel, Inc. v. 
Zeeman Mfg. Co.,10 the plaintiff researched and developed a suit 
with “a distinctive design combination [on the] pocket treatment 
and stitching.”11 The designer spent substantial time and money 
to create and promote this suit,12 and, as a result, the item 
                                                          
3 Wolfenstein v. Fashion Originator’s Guild of Am., 244 A.D. 656, 657 
(N.Y. 1935). 
4 J. JARNOW, M. GUERREIRO & B. JUDELLE, INSIDE THE FASHION 
BUSINESS: TEXT AND READINGS 28 (4th ed. 1987). 
5 Id. at 150. 
6 PAUL R. PARADISE, TRADEMARK COUNTERFEITING, PRODUCT PIRACY, 
AND THE BILLION DOLLAR THREAT TO THE U.S. ECONOMY 77 (1999). 
7 Rocky Schmidt, Comment, Designer Law: Fashioning a Remedy for 
Design Piracy, 30 UCLA L. REV. 861, 862 (1983). 
8 Id.; Stuart Jay Young, Freebooters in Fashions: The Need for a 
Copyright in Textile and Garment Designs, 9 COPYRIGHT L. SYMP. (ASCAP) 
76, 103 n.10 (1958). 
9 Jennifer Mencken, A Design for the Copyright of Fashion, B.C. INTELL. 
PROP. & TECH. F. 121201 n.75 (1997), available at http://www.bc.edu/bc_ 
org/avp/law/st_org/iptf/articles/content/1997121201.html. 
10 203 U.S.P.Q. 585 (N.D. Ga. 1978). 
11 Id. at 588. 
12 “One estimate of the cost of producing a ‘sample line’ is $25,000.” 
Leslie J. Hagin, A Comparative Analysis of Copyright Laws Applied to 
Fashion Works: Renewing the Proposal for Folding Fashion Works Into the 
United States Copyright Regime, 26 TEX. INT’L L.J. 341, 388 n.25 (1991) 
(citing Telephone Interview with Bob Berkowitz, Chairman of the Board, 
Apparel Guild (Apr. 27, 1990) (documentation on file with the Texas 
International Law Journal)). 
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became quite popular.13 The defendant purchased one of 
plaintiff’s suits, had it copied by his designers, and returned the 
original suit for a refund.14 Thereafter, cheaper copies appeared 
on the market.15 
Design piracy is unfair to designers and detrimental to 
competition. It is unfair to allow design pirates to reap the 
benefits of the original designer’s creativeness, labor and risk-
taking:16 
Copying destroys the style value of dresses which are 
copied. Women will not buy dresses at a good price at 
one store if dresses which look about the same are offered 
for sale at another store at half those prices. For this 
reason, copying substantially reduces the number and 
amount of reorders which the original creators get. With 
this uncertainty with respect to reorders, original creators 
cannot afford to buy materials in large quantities as they 
otherwise would. This tends to increase the cost of their 
dresses and the prices at which they must be sold. 
Reputation for honesty, style, and service is an important 
asset of retailers. Copying often injures such a reputation. 
A customer who has bought a dress at one store and later 
sees a copy of it at another store at a lower price is quite 
likely to think that the retailer from whom she bought the 
dress lacks ability to select distinctive models and that she 
has been overcharged. Dresses are returned and 
                                                          
13 See Johnny Carson Apparel, 203 U.S.P.Q. at 588. 
14 Id. The court held that while there is a great similarity in the style of 
the plaintiff’s and defendants’ suits, defendants had a right to copy the style. 
Id. at 593. The decisive question was whether defendant’s methods of 
promotion created a likelihood of confusion in the public mind as to the source 
of the garments. Id. at 594. The court found that there was “no evidence of 
actual confusion.” Id. at 595. The court found that the defendants, while 
acting with an improper intent, carried out their promotional scheme in such 
an inept fashion—whether deliberately or not—that plaintiff’s rights were not 
disturbed. Id. 
15 Id. at 595. “Plaintiff discontinued the model at least in part in response 
to complaints from its dealers about cheap imitations.” Id. at 593. 
16 See Hagin, supra note 12, at 364. 
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customers are lost.17 
“Recent studies suggest that industrial design . . . cannot 
yield long-term rewards to innovators if the short-term profits 
from successful innovation are consistently appropriated by free-
riders who do not share the costs and risks of the creative 
process.”18 As a result, over time, the designers whose talents 
and designs are being pirated will “be driven out of target 
markets by cut-throat competitors who never adequately fund the 
process of design innovations.”19 
Those opposed to the idea of apparel designs receiving any 
type of governmental protection argue that there is both a public 
welfare and an economic interest in allowing garments to be 
copied and sold at a cheaper price.20 Arguably, the copyist is 
satisfying a public demand by supplying consumers with copies 
because the consumer is either unable or unwilling to spend the 
money necessary for the originals.21 This reflects a process 
known as the style cycle that has long been recognized in the 
fashion industry.22 
According to this theory, the wealthy class sets the fashion 
trends because they wish to be distinctive.23 A second group of 
consumers emulates the first group and so on down the chain.24 
The lower classes buy cheaper adaptations of the styles.25 
Presumably, by the time a style reaches the masses, the trend has 
become commonplace and has already become abandoned by the 
trendsetters.26 
                                                          
17 See id. at 364-65 (citing Wm. Filene’s Sons Co. v. Fashion 
Originators’ Guild of Am., 90 F.2d 556, 558 (1st Cir. 1937)). 
18 J.H. Reichman, Design Protection and the Legislative Agenda, 55 L. & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 281, 283 (1992). 
19 Id. at 284. 
20 Kenneth D. Hutchinson, Design Piracy, 18 HARV. BUS. REV. 191, 194 
(1939-40). 
21 Id. 
22 Id. 
23 Id. at 195. 
24 Id. 
25 Id. 
26 Id. 
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Although the style cycle theory still exists, modern-day 
technology has given the masses access to copies of original 
designs much sooner than in the past.27 With the advent of 
television and the Internet, the fashions worn by the wealthy class 
are seen immediately and can be copied overnight.28 While some 
imitation is desirable for fashion to proliferate,29 Congress needs 
to set a limit. Unless designers feel secure that they will profit 
from their creations, their incentive to create new works will 
dwindle.30 
The Copyright Act is the appropriate form of protection for 
apparel designs because “one purpose of copyright protection is 
to provide equity to the artist,”31 which “allow[s] the creator of a 
work of art to enjoy the rewards of his effort”32 and encourages 
artistic creation.33 One of the most substantial things that design 
pirates steal is the original designer’s equity because the pirates 
sell imitations of the original design at cheaper prices; thus, some 
have called for copyright law to be amended to include protection 
for apparel designs.34 
The issue of design protection is “one of the most significant 
and pressing items of unfinished business” of copyright 
revision.35 This note explores the history of design protection in 
the United States and critiques the current state of the law as 
                                                          
27 Peter K. Schalestock, Forms of Redress for Design Piracy: How 
Victims can use Existing Copyright Law, 21 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 113, 115 
(1997). 
28 Id. 
29 See Hutchinson, supra note 20, at 193. 
30 S. Priya Bharathi, Comment, There is More Than One Way to Skin a 
Copycat: The Emergence of Trade Dress to Combat Design Piracy of Fashion 
Works, 27 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1667, 1671 (1996). 
31 See Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 
(1975) (“Creative work is to be encouraged and rewarded . . . . The 
immediate effect of our copyright law is to secure a fair return for an ‘author’s 
creative labor.’”). 
32 See Schmidt, supra note 7, at 873. 
33 See id. at 874. 
34 See Bharathi, supra note 30, at 1670. 
35 Barbara Ringer, The Unfinished Business of Copyright Revision, 24 
UCLA L. REV. 951, 976 (1977). 
NURBHAIMACRO4-29.DOC 7/24/02  11:30 AM 
494 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
applied to the protection of garment designs. It also recommends 
that Congress add a new chapter to Title 17 of the U.S. Code 
specifically geared toward the protection of apparel designs. 
Congress should extend the boundaries of copyright protection in 
order to encourage the “progress of science and useful arts”36 and 
to reward the efforts of fashion designers. 
I. HISTORY OF DESIGN PROTECTION 
A. Protection Under the Early Copyright Statutes 
The Copyright Act of 1976 only protects “original works of 
authorship.”37 The first copyright statute, passed in 1790, 
protected only maps, charts, and books.38 Over the years, 
however, copyright protection was extended to “literary works, 
musical works, dramatic works, pantomimes and choreographic 
works, pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works, motion pictures, 
other audiovisual works, and sound recordings.”39 Since its 
inception, copyright law has continued to evolve.40 Specifically, 
protection has been extended as technology has advanced.41 
Although three-dimensional objects were granted copyright 
protection in 1870, when protection was granted to “painting, 
drawing, chromo, statue, statuary, and . . . models or designs 
intended to be perfected as works of the fine arts,”42 the phrase 
“fine arts” excluded designs of useful articles, such as apparel 
designs.43 In 1909 the Copyright Act was revised, and the word 
                                                          
36 The Constitution expressly gives Congress the right “to promote the 
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors 
and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and 
Discoveries.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
37 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2000). 
38 1 Stat. 124 (1790). 
39 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2000). 
40 See Hagin, supra note 12, at 346-47. 
41 See id. 
42 Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, § 86, 16 Stat. 198, 212 (repealed 1916). 
43 See Young, supra note 8, at 81. 
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“fine” was dropped.44 It thus appeared that useful articles could 
gain protection.45 To the disappointment of fashion designers, 
however, although the new law did not differentiate between 
“fine arts” and arts that have a useful function, a 1910 Copyright 
Office regulation did.46 Regulation 12(g) provided: 
Works of art—This term includes all works belonging 
fairly to the so-called fine arts. (Paintings, drawings, and 
sculpture.) 
Productions of the industrial arts utilitarian in purpose and 
character are not subject to copyright registration, even if 
artistically made or ornamented. 
No copyright exists in toys, games, dolls, advertising, 
novelties, garments, laces, woven fabrics, or any similar 
articles.47 
At the time, the prospect of protection for fashion design 
seemed hopeless because garments undeniably serve a utilitarian 
purpose.48 Thus, the fashion industry decided to take matters into 
its own hands.49 
In 1935 the Fashion Originator’s Guild of America formed a 
trade association of garment manufacturers and retailers whose 
mission was to protect designers from style piracy.50 Retailers 
and manufacturers signed a “declaration of cooperation” wherein 
they pledged to deal only in original creations.51 The Guild had 
an extensive design registration bureau, and as part of the 
                                                          
44 See id. 
45 In § 5(g) of the 1909 Act, “works of art; models or designs for works 
of art” were listed among articles eligible for copyright protection. 
46 See Young, supra note 8, at 81-82. 
   47 See id. at 82 (citing WEIL, AMERICAN COPYRIGHT LAW 625 (1917)). In 
White v. Lombardy Dresses, 40 F. Supp. 548, 551, (S.D.N.Y. 1941), the 
court said, “It may be that new designs ought to be entitled to a limited 
copyright, but that remedy is with Congress.” 
48 See Young, supra note 8, at 83. 
49 See id. at 106. 
50 See id. at 107. 
51 Fashion Originators’ Guild of Am. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457, 461-62 
(1941). 
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enforcement procedures, the bureau sent its most potent weapon, 
the little red card, to all “non-cooperating retailers.”52 Guild 
members were forbidden from dealing with a red-card holder 
under penalty of large fines.53 
The Guild was highly effective. In fact, in 1936, the Guild 
controlled 60% of the market for women’s clothes that cost at 
least $10.75 and 38% of all women’s garments wholesaling at 
$6.75 and up.54 Although the Fashion Originator’s Guild of 
America was successful in combating design piracy, the Guild 
was shut down in 1941 by the Supreme Court because its 
collective practices were found to violate the Sherman Anti-Trust 
Act.55 Thus, the garment industry was left with the Copyright Act 
of 1909 as its only source of protection. 
In 1949 the Copyright Office expanded the scope of articles 
to which copyright protection was available by broadening the 
definition of “works of art.”56 The amendment read as follows: 
§ 202.8 Works of art. (Class G)-(a) in general. This class 
includes works of artistic craftsmanship, insofar as their 
form but not their mechanical or utilitarian aspects are 
concerned, such as artistic jewelry, enamels, glassware, 
and tapestries, as well as works belonging to the fine arts, 
such as paintings, drawings, and sculpture.57 
At the time, many hoped the Copyright Office would eventually 
                                                          
52 See Young, supra note 8, at 107. 
An extensive design registration bureau containing the designs 
registered by Guild members was maintained. The [red] cards were 
sent to all members from time to time bearing on their face, the name 
of a “non-cooperating” retailer. Henceforth all other members of the 
Guild were forbidden to deal with that retailer under penalty of large 
fines. 
 Id. 
53 Fashion Originators’ Guild of Am., 312 U.S. at 463. 
54 Id. at 462. 
55 Id. at 467-68. The Court’s rationale was that the Guild’s practices 
substantially lessened competition and tended to create a monopoly. 
56 Cameron K. Wehringer, Dress Designs: Time Protection and 
Copyrights, 50 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 824 (1958). 
57 37 C.F.R. § 202.8(a) (1952). 
NURBHAIMACRO4-29.DOC 7/24/02  11:30 AM 
 STYLE PIRACY REVISITED 497 
broaden its definition of works of art to include apparel designs 
because garments contain artistic expression, but the Copyright 
Office did no such thing.58 Instead, the Copyright Office and the 
courts took the position that fashion’s dominant function is 
utilitarian.59 Advocates for the protection of apparel designs, on 
the other hand, maintained that while clothing does cover the 
human body, its primary market value rests not in its function, 
but in its appearance.60 
In 1954, the U.S. Supreme Court ratified the 1949 regulation 
in Mazer v. Stein,61 the leading case on the copyrightability of 
useful articles. In Mazer, the Supreme Court upheld the 
copyrightability of a statuette despite the fact that it had been 
reproduced for mass-market distribution and sold as a lamp 
base.62 The Court held that the statuette qualified as a “work[] of 
art” eligible for copyright protection even though it served a 
functional purpose and had been distributed as part of a utilitarian 
object.63 
Because the preparation of a statuette requires artistic skill, 
the Court found that the statuette qualified as fine art without 
defining a “work of art.”64 The Court stated that “[i]ndividual 
perception of the beautiful is too varied a power to permit a 
narrow or rigid concept of art,”65 thus leading an increased 
number of industrial designers to seek protection under § 5(g) of 
the 1909 Act.66 To clarify that all ornamental useful articles could 
                                                          
58 See Young, supra note 8, at 83. 
59 See Wm. Filene’s Sons Co. v. Fashion Originator’s Guild of Am., 14 
F. Supp. 353, 354 (D. Mass. 1936), aff’d, 90 F.2d 556 (1st Cir. 1937). 
60 Id. 
61 347 U.S. 201 (1954). 
62 Id. at 202. 
63 Id. at 213. The Court also held that eligibility for design patent 
protection did not preclude copyright protection. Id. at 217. 
64 Protection for the Artistic Aspects of Articles of Utility, 72 HARV. L. 
REV. 1520, 1525 (1959). 
65 Mazer, 347 U.S. at 214. 
66 61 Register of Copyrights Ann. Rep. 12 (1958). The number of “works 
of art” registered under § 5(g) of the 1909 Act swelled from 3,170 in 1954 to 
greater than 5,000 in 1958. Id. 
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not gain protection, the Copyright Office enacted Regulation § 
202.10(c) to narrow the Supreme Court’s open-ended extension 
of copyright protection: 
If the sole intrinsic function of an article is its utility, the 
fact that the article is unique and attractively shaped will 
not qualify it as a work of art. However, if the shape of a 
utilitarian article incorporates features such as artistic 
sculpture, carving, or pictorial representation, which can 
be identified separately and are capable of existing 
independently as a work of art, such features will be 
eligible for registration.67 
The “sole intrinsic function” test was applied in Ted Arnold Ltd. 
v. Silvercraft Co.,68 where the court recognized copyright 
protection for the casing of a pencil sharpener simulating the 
appearance of an antique telephone. The court stated, “[We] 
would not agree with defendant that its ‘sole intrinsic 
function . . . is its utility.’ Customers are paying fifteen dollars 
for it, not because it sharpens pencils uncommonly well, but 
because it is also a decorative conversation piece.”69 
Unfortunately, the regulation failed to address the “linedrawing 
problem inherent in delineating the extent of copyright protection 
available for works as applied art.”70 In fact, the “sole intrinsic 
function” test continues to confuse the law. 
B. The Copyright Act of 1976 
The 1976 amendments to the Copyright Act codified the 
Supreme Court’s holding in Mazer.71 The House Committee 
report noted that “[u]nless the shape of . . . [the] industrial 
product contains some element that, physically or conceptually, 
                                                          
67 37 C.F.R. § 202.10(c) (1959) (revoked Jan. 1, 1978, 43 Fed. Reg. 966 
(1978), and codified in the current Act at § 101). 
68 259 F. Supp. 733 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). 
69 Id. at 736. 
70 MELVILLE B. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2.08[B] at 2-89 
(1981). 
71 See Schalestock, supra note 27, at 118. 
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can be identified as separable from the utilitarian aspects of that 
article, the design would not be copyrighted under the bill.”72 
While physical separability, in which the functional part of an 
object must be physically detachable from the artistic part,73 is 
quite simple to apply, conceptual separability is not.74 It is clear, 
however, that the 1976 Act generally denies protection to apparel 
designs because they are categorized as “useful articles” under § 
101. Under current copyright law, a sufficiently original design 
on fabric can be granted copyright protection;75 however, an 
                                                          
72 Richard G. Frenkel, Intellectual Property in the Balance: Proposals for 
Improving Industrial Design Protection in the Post-Trips Era, 32 LOY. L.A. 
L. REV. 531, 541 (1999) (citing H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 55 (1976), 
reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5668) (alteration in original) (internal 
citations omitted). 
73 See id. (citing Parfums Givenchy, Inc. v. C & C Beauty Sales, Inc., 
832 F. Supp. 1378, 1392 (C.D. Cal. 1993) (holding the artistic labeling of a 
perfume box as physically separable from the utilitarian aspects of the perfume 
itself, thereby avoiding a conceptual separability analysis.)). 
74 Conceptual separability is defined as follows: 
Conceptual separability means that the pictorial, graphic, or 
sculptural features, while physically inseparable by ordinary means 
from the utilitarian item, are nevertheless clearly recognizable as a 
pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work . . . independent of the shape of 
the useful article, i.e., the artistic features can be imagined separately 
and independently from the useful article without destroying the basic 
shape of the useful article. 
See Hagin, supra note 12, at 350 (citing Whimsicality, Inc. v. Rubie’s 
Costumes Co., 721 F. Supp. 1566, 1571 (E.D.N.Y. 1984) (quoting 
Compendium II of Copyright Office Practices, § 505.02)) (internal citations 
omitted). 
75 See Samara Bros., Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 165 F.3d 120, 132 
(1998) (holding that pattern designs depicting familiar objects, such as hearts, 
daisies, and strawberries, are entitled to very narrow copyright protection; 
however, “their registrations provide a presumption of validity, which Wal-
Mart has failed to overcome”), cert. granted, 529 U.S. 205, 216 (2000) 
(holding that “in an action for infringement of unregistered trade dress under § 
43(a) of the Lanham Act, a product’s design is distinctive, and therefore 
protectible, only upon a showing of secondary meaning”). See also Peter Pan 
Fabrics, Inc. v. Brenda Fabrics, Inc., 169 F. Supp. 142, 143 (S.D.N.Y. 1959) 
(holding design printed upon a dress fabric is a proper subject of copyright, 
both as a work of art and as a print); Dan River, Inc. v. Sanders Sale 
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original apparel design receives no such protection due to its 
usefulness.76 Although apparel works emphasize style and 
appearance instead of utility, and even though competitiveness 
turns on originality in the fashion industry, the doctrine of 
conceptual separability does not provide copyright protection for 
apparel.77 The prevailing opinion is that products, such as ladies’ 
dresses or any other industrial products, cannot be copyrighted if 
they do not contain some element that physically or conceptually 
can be identified as separable from the utilitarian aspects of the 
article.78 
C. Title II of the Copyright Act of 1976 
Over the years, numerous bills have been introduced in 
Congress aimed at obtaining more protection for ornamental 
designs of useful articles beyond just apparel.79 With respect to 
the Copyright Act of 1976, design protection appeared as Title II 
of the general copyright revision bill.80 Title II was meant to 
protect the “original ornamental design of a useful article.”81 
Designs that were seen as “staple or commonplace [or] dictated 
solely by a utilitarian function of the article were excluded.”82 
                                                          
Enterprises, Inc., 97 F. Supp. 2d 426, 429 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (holding that 
copyright protection extends to fabric designs). 
76 See Schalestock, supra note 27, at 122-23 (citing 56 Fed. Reg. 56530-
02 (Nov. 5, 1991)). 
77 Leonard S. Elman, The Limits of State Jurisdiction in Affording 
Common Law Protection to Clothing Designs, 11 VAND. L. REV. 501, 502-
503 (1958). 
78 “For example, the district court in Whimsicality, Inc. v. Rubie’s 
Costumes Co. noted that extending copyright protection to high fashion 
designs would be ‘contrary to well established case law, Copyright Office and 
historical precedent.’” Hagin, supra note 12, at 350-51 (citing Whimsicality, 
721 F.Supp. at 1575). 
79 See Young, supra note 8, at 103. 
80 See H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 54 (1976), reprinted in 1976 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5668. 
81 S. 22, tit.II, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 201(a), 122 Cong. Rec. 3856-59 
(1975), reprinted in S. Rep. No. 473, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 39-47 (1975). 
82 Id. § 202. In an effort to win congressional approval, the three-
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Title II, the Design Protection Act of 1975, was not passed by 
the House “because the new form of design protection provided 
by Title II could not truly be considered copyright protection.”83 
Although the House Report noted that the bill failed to 
designate a specific agency to administer the system, there was a 
more fundamental objection. The Department of Justice was 
concerned, as was the court in Fashion Originators’ Guild of 
America v. FTC,84 that Title II would create a new set of 
exclusive rights, the benefits of which did not necessarily 
outweigh “the disadvantage of removing such designs from free 
public use.”85 To date Congress has passed no bills, but the 
history of design protection and current sui generis acts, such as 
the Digital Millennium Copyright Act,86 provide hope that 
another chapter could be added to Title 17.87 
                                                          
dimensional shape of wearing apparel was also excluded. Id. § 202(3). 
83 See H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 50. 
84 312 U.S. 457 (1941). 
85 See H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 50. See also FOGA v. FTC, 312 U.S. 
457 at 465. The court in Fashion Originators’ Guild of America v. Federal 
Trade Commission issued a cease-and-desist order to the Fashion Originators’ 
Guild because the organization tended to create a monopoly in violation of the 
Sherman and Clayton Acts. The court found that the Guild deprived the public 
of the advantages that flow from free competition, stating, in part, the 
following reasons: 
[I]t narrows the outlets to which garment and textile manufacturers 
can sell and the sources from which retailers can buy; subjects all 
retailers and manufacturers who decline to comply with the Guild’s 
program to an organized boycott; takes away the freedom of action of 
members by requiring each to reveal to the Guild the intimate details 
of their individual affairs; and has both as its necessary tendency and 
as its purpose and effect the direct suppression of competition from 
the sale of unregistered textiles and copied designs. 
Id. (internal citations omitted). Similar to the court in FOGA v. FTC, Congress 
rejected Title II because “it feared creating a new monopoly for industrial 
design.” See Frenkel, supra note 72, at 543. 
86 H.R. 2281, reprinted in 144 CONG. REC. H10, 048-64 (daily ed. Oct. 
8, 1998). 
87 See Frenkel, supra note 72, at 577. 
NURBHAIMACRO4-29.DOC 7/24/02  11:30 AM 
502 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
II. THE CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW 
A. Why Copyright Protection is the Best Alternative 
Copyright protection appears to be the best solution to design 
piracy because “the primary purpose of copyright law is to 
secure ‘the general benefits derived by the public from the labors 
of authors.’”88 Additionally, copyright law is flexible, and it has 
already been expanded to afford architects protection in their 
works.89 “Critics have observed that the VHDPA could ‘easily be 
expanded’ to cover industrial design, including ‘clothing 
designs.’”90 Another benefit of copyright protection is that the 
application process for protection is “cheap and expeditious.”91 
Apparel designs cannot effectively be patented for a number 
of reasons, the most practical of which is time.92 Before the 
Patent and Trademark Office will issue a patent, a search of prior 
art is required, which could take several months.93 Due to the 
short life of apparel designs,94 a work may have little or no 
commercial value by the time a design patent is granted.95 In fact, 
in Jack Adelman, Inc. v. Sonners & Gordon, Inc., the U.S. 
District Court for the Southern District of New York noted the 
practical inadequacy of patent protection for dress designs 
because of the short life span of designs and the rigorous 
                                                          
88 See Schmidt, supra note 7, at 874. 
89 “The Digital Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”) contains as a part 
of it the Vessel Hull Design Protection Act (“VHDPA”).” See Frenkel, supra 
note 72, at 576. 
90 See Frenkel, supra note 72, at 577 (citing Letter from Peter Jaszi of the 
Digital Future Coalition to Pat Roberts, United States Senator 2 (Aug. 24, 
1998) (on file with Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review)). 
91 Ralph S. Brown, Copyright-like Protection for Designs, 19 U. BALT. 
L. REV. 308, 310 (1989) [hereinafter Brown, Copyright-like Protection]. 
92 Id. 
93 Id. 
94 Fashion designs usually have a shelf life of only a few months because 
trends quickly go out of style. Id. 
95 See Young, supra note 8, at 90. 
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requirements and time involved in obtaining a patent.96 In 
addition, the patent application process is expensive and 
complex.97 Many designers, especially new designers, cannot 
afford to apply for such protection.98 Because patent protection is 
not suitable for apparel protection, fashion designers should be 
able to look to some variation of copyright law for protection 
against piracy and compensation for their creations.99 
B. The Confusing Conceptual Separability Test 
A fashion designer seeking copyright protection must 
convince a judge that his design is not useful or that the useful 
part of the item is separable from the artistic part.100 As a result, 
“[n]umerous tests have evolved in the utility and separability 
areas; however, none of these tests provides a clear, predictable 
path for protection of apparel designs.”101 
1. The Sole Intrinsic Function Test 
Under the sole intrinsic function test, “copyright is denied to 
an article if its “sole intrinsic function . . . is its utility.”102 To 
                                                          
96 112 F. Supp. 187 (S.D.N.Y. 1934). The court stated as follows: 
The patent law provides for protection to those who create dresses of 
novel design, Title 35 U.S.C.A. §73, now 35 U.S.C.A. §171, but as 
a practical matter in many instances this fails to give the needed 
protection, for designs and patterns usually are short-lived and with 
the conditions and time incidental to obtaining the patent, this 
protection comes too late, if at all. 
Id. at 190. The court ultimately held that a copyright on a dress-design 
drawing gave the copyright holder the exclusive right to make copies or 
reprints of the drawing only, but no exclusive rights to produce the dress 
itself; that is, the copyrightable work was the drawing, not the resulting dress 
style. Id. 
97 See Brown, Copyright-like Protection, supra note 91, at 310. 
98 See Hagin, supra note 12, at 355-56. 
99 See id. at 374-75. 
100 See Frenkel, supra note 72, at 544. 
101 See id. at 544. 
102 Ralph S. Brown, Design Protection: An Overview, 34 UCLA L. REV. 
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understand the current copyright analysis for industrial designs, 
one must be aware of the different ways courts have interpreted 
Regulation § 202.10(c). Esquire, Inc. v. Ringer, the leading case 
advocating the sole intrinsic function test, was decided under the 
1909 Copyright Act and is key to understanding the regulation.103 
In Esquire, the lower court granted copyright protection to 
the designer of modern light fixtures when he brought a 
mandamus action to require registration of his design.104 
Copyright registration had been denied on the theory that the 
fixtures did not contain “elements, either alone or in 
combination, which are capable of independent existence as a 
copyrightable pictorial, graphic or sculptural work apart from the 
utilitarian aspect.”105 The court stated that “the lamp’s intrinsic 
function was not solely its utility because the lights served to 
decorate, as well as to illuminate, especially during the day, 
when they were exclusively decorative.”106 The court deemed the 
fixture copyrightable even though it recognized the Register’s 
fear that a grant of copyright in this instance would “open the 
‘floodgates’ to copyrighting ‘myriads of industrial designs of 
everything from automobiles to bathtubs to dresses.’”107 
While the lower court’s decision appears to give apparel 
designers a glimmer of hope, since the court disregarded the 
Copyright Office’s concerns about “opening the floodgates” to 
tempt creators of industrial designs, this hope was destroyed 
when the decision was reversed on appeal.108 Swayed by 
legislative intent inherent in the fact that the seventy-odd design 
protection bills introduced in Congress since 1914 had failed to 
be enacted, the Register’s concern that the floodgates would 
open, and the Register’s expertise in such matters, the court 
                                                          
1341, 1345 (1987) (citing 37 C.F.R. § 202.10(c) (1956)). 
103 414 F. Supp. 939 (D.D.C. 1976), rev’d, 591 F.2d 753, 795 (D.C. 
Cir. 1978). 
104 Esquire, 414 F. Supp. at 940. 
105 Esquire, 591 F.2d at 798-99. 
106 Erica Lehrer, The Design of Design Law Today, 35 COPYRIGHT L. 
SYMP. (ASCAP) 145, 162 (1988). 
107 Id. (citing Esquire, 414 F. Supp. 941). 
108 Esquire, 591 F.2d at 796. 
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decided that the registration had been properly denied.109 
The appellate court justified its reversal by stating that an 
object is characterized as useful when it has “an intrinsic 
utilitarian function that is not merely to portray the appearance of 
the article or to convey information.”110 This new language 
narrowed the reach of the copyright statute and ruled out the 
protection of articles, such as light fixtures, with dual intrinsic 
functions.111 The court glossed over the notion of “conceptual 
separability” as irrelevant to the case at hand.112 
2. The Primary-Subsidiary Test 
Under the primary-subsidiary test, copyright protection can 
be granted if the design’s primary purpose is ornamental and its 
utilitarian purpose is subsidiary.113 The Second Circuit’s first 
major opinion discussing conceptual separability114 originated in 
Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories by Pearl, Inc.,115 a case that the 
Second Circuit described as being on the “razor’s edge of 
copyright law.”116 
 In Kieselstein-Cord, the Copyright Office and the courts 
granted copyright protection to the designer of ornamental belt 
buckles because “the primary ornamental aspects of the . . . 
buckles [were] conceptually separable from their subsidiary 
utilitarian function.”117 The court went on to state that “these are 
not ordinary buckles; they are sculptured designs cast in precious 
metal—decorative in nature and used as jewelry, principally [as] 
                                                          
109 See Lehrer, supra note 106, at 163. 
110 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000) (defining “useful article”). 
111 See Lehrer, supra note 106, at 163. 
112 Id. at 162 n.87. The court concluded that when legislative history was 
viewed in its entirety, the “isolated reference” to conceptual separability 
“disappears.” Esquire, 591 F.2d at 804. 
113 Keith Aoki, Contradiction and Context in American Copyright Law, 9 
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 303, 335 (1991). 
114 See Frenkel, supra note 72, at 547. 
115 632 F.2d 989 (2d Cir. 1980). 
116 Kieselstein-Cord, 632 F.2d at 990. 
117 Id. 
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ornamentation.”118 It is difficult to understand why apparel 
designs cannot get protection in light of this approach. Many top 
fashion designers create garments, especially for the runway, that 
are decorative in nature and principally ornamental, which 
illustrates that some designs can have conceptually separable 
elements.119 
Copyright protection was granted to costume jewelry in 
Trifari, Krussman & Fishel, Inc. v. Charel Co.120 when the court 
used a primary-subsidiary test to determine if the jewelry was 
protectible under copyright law. The court stated the following: 
In the case of costume jewelry, while the overall form is 
to some extent pre-determined by the use for which it is 
intended, the creator is free to express his idea of beauty 
in many ways. Unlike an automobile, a refrigerator, or a 
gas range, the design of a necklace or of a bracelet may 
take as many forms as the ingenuity of the artist may 
conceive.121 
Jewelry is viewed as ornamental, rather than utilitarian, because 
it is artistic and decorative.122 Advocates of apparel design 
protection would argue that the design of a garment, like jewelry, 
“may take as many forms as the ingenuity of the designer may 
conceive.”123 Unfortunately, the courts have failed to recognize to 
date that many garments express beauty and are often seen as 
“wearable art” in today’s society.124 
3. The Inextricably Intertwined Test 
Another interpretation of conceptual separability has been 
coined the “inextricably intertwined test,”125 wherein an article is 
                                                          
118 Id. at 993. 
119 See Hagin, supra note 12, at 348. 
120 134 F. Supp. 551 (S.D.N.Y. 1955). 
121 See Hagin, supra note 12, at 353 (citing Trifari, 134 F. Supp. at 553). 
122 Trifari, 134 F. Supp. at 553. 
123 See Hagin, supra note 12, at 352-53. 
124 See Mencken, supra note 9. 
125 See Frenkel, supra note 72, at 548. 
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denied copyright protection if the “aesthetic and artistic 
features . . . are inseparable from [its] use as [a] utilitiarian 
article.”126 This test evolved from a Second Circuit case, Carol 
Barnhart, Inc. v. Economy Cover Corp.,127 in which the court 
denied copyright protection to copied mannequins of partial 
human torsos.128 The court distinguished Kieselstein-Cord on the 
ground that the artistic design of the belt buckles was “wholly 
unnecessary to [the] performance of the utilitarian function.”129 
The court found that the artistic elements of the mannequin torsos 
were “inextricably intertwined” with the torsos’ utilitarian 
features, and, therefore, were not copyrightable.130 This test 
makes conceptual separability such a high hurdle for industrial 
design that few works, if any, could gain copyright protection.131 
4. The Denicola/Brandir Artistic Judgment Test 
The Second Circuit in Brandir International, Inc. v. Cascade 
Pacific Lumber Co.132 adopted what is known as the 
“Denicola/Brandir artistic judgment test.”133 Professor Denicola 
stated that “the dominant feature of modern industrial design is 
the merger of aesthetic and utilitarian concerns” and proposed a 
sliding scale between art and utility.134 He believed that the more 
                                                          
126 Carol Barnhart, Inc. v. Econ. Cover Corp., 773 F.2d 411, 418 (2d 
Cir. 1985). 
127 Id. 
128 Id. at 418. 
129 Id. at 419. 
130 Id. 
131 See Frenkel, supra note 72, at 548 (citing Aoki, supra note 113, at 
340). 
132 834 F.2d 1142 (2d Cir. 1987). 
133 Robert Denicola is a professor of law at the University of Nebraska. 
“He surveyed the different tests for conceptual separability and concluded that 
none of the tests truly captured the purpose of separability—to divide 
copyrightable art from uncopyrightable industrial design.” See Frenkel, supra 
note 72, at 550 (citing Robert C. Denicola, Applied Art and Industrial Design: 
A Suggested Approach to Copyright in Useful Articles, 67 MINN. L. REV. 707, 
739 (1983)). 
134 See Denicola, supra note 133, at 707, 739. 
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an artist is concerned with utilitarian considerations, the less right 
the work has to copyright protection.135 Judge Oakes restated the 
Denicola test as follows: 
If design elements reflect a merger of aesthetic and 
functional considerations, the artistic aspects of a work 
cannot be said to be conceptually separate from the 
utilitarian elements. Conversely, where design elements 
can be identified as reflecting the designer’s artistic 
judgment exercised independently of functional 
influences, conceptual separability exists.136 
The court found that no conceptual separability existed because 
the aesthetic aspects of a bicycle rack were the same as the 
functional aspect.137 
Judge Oakes’s restatement of the Denicola test has been 
criticized for two reasons. First, while Professor Denicola’s 
approach seems to create a sliding scale between artistic influence 
and functionality, Judge Oakes seems to require that industrial 
design be a result of either “artistic judgment” or “functional 
influences.”138 Furthermore, the test is difficult to apply because 
it requires judicial analysis of artistic judgment.139 Judges are ill 
suited to assess artistic judgment because they are not necessarily 
skilled in that area, and conflicting rulings are likely.140 It should 
be noted, moreover, that the two interpretations of the Denicola 
test potentially conflict: Professor Denicola’s interpretation 
allows protection for garment designs reflecting more aesthetic 
considerations than utilitarian ones, while Judge Oakes’s 
interpretation of the test denies protection to articles in which 
functional considerations are manifested.141 
This conflict is illustrated in Whimsicality, Inc. v. Rubie’s 
                                                          
135 See Denicola, supra note 133, at 739. 
136 Brandir, 834 F.2d at 1145. 
137 Id. at 1146-47. 
138 See Frenkel, supra note 72, at 551. 
139 See id. 
140 See id. at 552. 
141 See id. at 551. 
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Costume Co.142 and National Theme Productions, Inc. v. Jerry B. 
Beck, Inc.143 In Whimsicality, the Second Circuit cited Brandir 
and found that the artistic and utilitarian functions of clothing 
merge.144 Thus, the court concluded that Halloween costumes 
could not be protected.145 On the other hand, in National, a 
California district court citing Brandir held that the function of 
costumes had little to do with their design and granted the 
costumes protection.146 The court went on to state that “the 
Second Circuit improperly applied the Denicola test . . . which 
will cause decisions to turn upon largely fortuitous 
circumstances.”147 Although the interpretation of the Denicola 
test in National could eventually protect garments, the standard is 
largely subjective and will continue to result in inconsistent 
decisions.148 
In a more recent decision, Severin Montres, Ltd. v. Yidah 
Watch Co.,149 a district court in California used the Brandir test 
to analyze whether a watch should be afforded copyright 
protection. The plaintiff, the licensee of the Gucci trademark for 
the purpose of creating watch designs,150 created the Gucci-G 
watch, a watch with its rectangular frame forming a three-
dimensional letter G,151 while the defendants made a J-watch and 
an E-watch.152 The defendants claimed the frame was functional 
and could not be copyrighted.153 The district court, however, 
relied on National and held “where design elements can be 
identified as reflecting the designer’s artistic judgment exercised 
                                                          
142 891 F.2d 452 (2d Cir. 1989). 
143 696 F. Supp. 1348 (S.D. Cal. 1988). 
144 See Whimsicality, 891 F.2d at 455. 
145 Id. 
146 See National, 696 F. Supp. at 1353-54. 
147 Id. at 1353 (quoting Brandir, 834 F.2d at 1151(Winter, J., concurring 
in part and dissenting in part)). 
148 See Frenkel, supra note 72, at 551. 
149 997 F. Supp. 1262 (C.D. Cal. 1997). 
150 Id. at 1264 n.1. 
151 Id. at 1265. 
152 Id. at 1263. 
153 Id. at 1265. 
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independently of functional influences, conceptual separability 
exists.”154 
The court held that the watches were copyrightable because it 
believed that the “plaintiff’s artistic expression contained enough 
artistic design to be unique and protectable under the Brandir 
test.”155 Under the Severin analysis, artistic apparel designs might 
be protectible if certain design elements, such as the sleeve or 
neckline configuration, or the cut of the garment, could be 
“identified as reflecting the designer’s artistic judgment exercised 
independently of the functional influences,” namely covering up 
the body.156 
5. The “Lack of Test” Approach 
“Of course, having a confusing test may be better than having 
no test at all. The Ninth Circuit seems to have exactly that—no 
test.”157 In Fabrica Inc. v. El Dorado Corp.,158 the Ninth Circuit 
merely cites the statute and its legislative history. In this case, 
Fabrica sought copyright protection for a folder of carpet 
samples.159 The court found that “no element of the folders . . . 
can be separated out and exist independently of their utilitarian 
aspects.”160 This case-by-case approach is undesirable because the 
court does not clearly explain its reasoning for failing to afford 
protection to the design in question, and thus fails to provide 
guidance to designers.161 
C. Fashion Today 
Apparel designs are not ordinary useful articles, especially 
                                                          
154 Id. (quoting National Theme Productions, 696 F. Supp. at 1353 and 
citing Brandir, 834 F.2d at 1145). 
155 See Frenkel, supra note 72, at 553. 
156 See id. 
157 See id. 
158 697 F.2d 890 (9th Cir. 1983). 
159 Id. at 892. 
160 Id. at 893. 
161 See Frenkel, supra note 72, at 553. 
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today when apparel is meant to be admired, analyzed, and 
viewed.162 In Poe v. Missing Persons,163 for example, an art 
student created a “swimsuit” made of clear plastic filled with 
crushed rock.164 The designer called her work a “soft sculpture” 
representing a swimsuit, while the defendants characterized the 
work as merely a swimsuit.165 The court held that the work could 
be afforded copyright protection because it was not clear “by 
looking at [the suit] whether a person wearing this object could 
move, walk, swim, sit, stand, or lie down without unwelcome or 
unintended exposure.”166 
Raising an important issue, the Poe court stated that “given 
the bizarre nature of what sometimes passes for high fashion, 
there may be a legitimate issue even as to the threshold question 
of utility.”167 Professor William Fryer of the University of 
Baltimore School of Law observed, “[W]hat some persons 
consider a costume is another person’s ordinary wear.”168 
Apparel designs and costumes are often indistinguishable today, 
making it difficult to determine whether a garment is utilitarian 
clothing or a non-utilitarian costume. 
The difficulty of distinguishing between costume and high-
end fashion is evident from viewing fashion shows and couture 
collections.169 Many of the designs created for “appearances” are 
                                                          
162 See Hagin, supra note 12, at 348. 
163 745 F.2d 1238 (9th Cir. 1984). 
164 Id. at 1242. 
165 Id. at 1239. 
166 Id. at 1242. Various apparel designs have been displayed in museums 
to be viewed as art. See Hagin, supra note 12, at 348. Similar to the 
Kieselstein-Cord belt buckles that were exhibited at the New York 
Metropolitan Museum of Art, Poe’s creation was displayed at the Los Angeles 
Institute for Contemporary Art. Id. In 2000, Giorgio Armani’s designs were 
displayed at the Guggenheim Museum in New York City. Ogale Idudu, High 
Fashion as Art: Couture in Limelight At London’s V&A—”Radical Fashion” 
Goes from Simple to Wild, WALL ST. J. EUROPE, Oct. 19, 2001, at 28,  
available at 2001 WL-WSJE 28845671. 
167 See Schalestock, supra note 27, at 123. 
168 See id. (citing Comment on file at the U.S. Copyright Office, Docket 
No. RM 90-7). 
169 See Mencken, supra note 9. 
NURBHAIMACRO4-29.DOC 7/24/02  11:30 AM 
512 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
intended to make an artistic statement.170 Style, rather than 
durability, is the dominant competitive factor in the fashion 
industry today.171 In addition, Halloween costumes are often 
designed to imitate the attire of others.172 An actor could wear an 
original garment in a movie or to an award show, and copies of 
that garment could be made for some to wear as a costume and 
for others to wear as everyday attire.173 
D. Piracy in the Apparel Industry 
Design piracy in the apparel industry is a tremendous 
problem. For example, the “Copycat King” Victor Costa174 
grossed approximately $50 million in 1988,175 and Jack 
Mulqueen176 grossed more than $200 million in 1981, mostly 
from copying the creations of other designers.177 Congress has 
not passed legislation that affords copyright protection to the 
                                                          
170 See id. 
171 Maurice A. Weikart, Design Piracy, 19 IND. L.J. 235, 256 (1944). 
172 Lane Hartill, What Costume to Wear for Halloween—Uncle Sam or 
Shrek?, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Oct. 24, 2001, at 14, available at 2001 
WL 3738593. 
173 Emily Mitchell, Couture May Not Seem So Important Anymore, Yet It 
Dazzles Modern Viewers of Fashion’s Grand Past, at http://www.time.com 
/time/international/1996/960122/fashion.html (last visited Mar. 20, 2001). 
174 Victor Costa was a Dallas-based designer “who interpret[ed] fanciful 
couture designs at lower prices. An ostrich-feather skirt with strapless sequin 
top from his fall collection [sold] for $850. Add at least one zero to that 
amount for the approximate price of a handmade Paris couture version.” 
Elizabeth Sporkin, Paris Couture—Oooh la law!; New Passion for French 
Fashion, USA TODAY, Oct. 14, 1987, at 1D, available at 1987 WL 4631418. 
175 See Hagin, supra note 12, at 347 (1991) (citing Bonnie Johnson, 
Copycat King Victor Costa Cuts the High Costa Designer Duds, PEOPLE, Aug. 
22, 1988, at 96). 
176 Jack Mulqueen was an apparel manufacturer that made most of its 
money from sales of garments that the company’s president readily admitted 
were copies of original creations of other designers. See Schmidt, supra note 
7, at 863. 
177 See id. 
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apparel industry as it has done for other industries.178 In fact, 
Congress has explicitly excluded apparel designs from the 
proposed bills.179 The purpose of the Design Anti-Piracy Act of 
1989, introduced by Representatives Kastenmeier and Moorhead, 
was to protect original designs of useful articles against 
unauthorized copying.180 Representative Moorhead stated that 
“[t]he bill would exclude protection for designs compose[d] of 
three dimensional shapes and surfaces with respect to apparel.”181 
Affording copyright protection to original apparel works 
would inspire designers to be more creative and would contribute 
to the “[p]rogress of [s]cience and useful [a]rts.”182 Over the 
years, Congress has carefully and gradually extended the reach of 
the Copyright Act to include an increasing number of artistic 
works.183 Since courts have found that designs on clothing may be 
                                                          
178 In 1984, Congress enacted a new category of quasi-copyright law to 
protect semiconductor chip designs (“mask works”) when pirated computer 
chip designs reached more than $100 million per year. See Hagin, supra note 
12, at 347 (citing Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984, 17 U.S.C. §§ 
901-14 (1988)). Furthermore, when the United States signed the Berne 
Convention, Congress enacted the Architectural Works Copyright Protection 
Act of 1990, which extends full copyright protection to architectural works. 
The Architectural Works Copyright Protection Act, Title VII of the Judicial 
Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089, 5132 (to be 
codified in various sections of 17 U.S.C.). 
179 See Hagin, supra note 12, at 347. 
180 135 Cong. Rec. E3484 (daily ed. Oct. 19, 1989). 
181 Id. (statement of Rep. Moorhead). 
182 See Hagin, supra note 12, at 342, 368-69. 
183 See id. at 348 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 6, 
reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5664 (“The history of copyright law 
has been one of gradual expansion in the types of works accorded 
protection.”)). Former Register of Copyrights Barbara Ringer has noted the 
following: 
Copyright law revision may be changing from a sexagenary event into 
something resembling a continuous process. In the course of the last 
twenty years, copyright has emerged as one of the most important 
areas of American property law. As this society moves deeper and 
deeper into that phase of economic life called “post-
industrialism,” . . . the extent to which copyrightable creations are 
protected by exclusive property interests can become central to 
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sufficiently original to receive copyright protection,184 it would be 
appropriate for Congress to take a step further and afford the 
design of original garments similar treatment. 
III. RECOMMENDED SOLUTION 
A. Current Copyright Protection 
The United States is a signatory to the Trade-Related Aspects 
of Intellectual Property Rights (“TRIPS”) Agreement, which 
provides its members with minimum standards of intellectual 
property protection.185 Although former President Clinton stated 
that the existing intellectual property laws in the United States are 
sufficient to protect industrial designs, design piracy is a big 
problem in this country, and current law inadequately addresses 
it.186 Because the United States has only complied with the 
minimum requirements of the Berne Convention,187 foreign 
fashion designers do not receive the same protection in the 
United States as they do overseas.188 
Under international rules, the creative works of fashion 
designers are protected for a limited term under copyright law.189 
                                                          
national growth. 
Barbara Ringer, The Unfinished Business of Copyright Revision, 24 UCLA L. 
REV. 951, 976 (1977). 
184 See Samara Bros., Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 165 F.3d at 132 
(finding that copyrights for pattern designs, which depict familiar objects, such 
as hearts, daisies, and strawberries, are entitled to very narrow protection). 
185 Laurence R. Helfer, Adjudicating Copyright Claims Under the TRIPS 
Agreement: The Case for a European Human Rights Analogy, 39 HARV. INT’L 
L.J. 357, 360 (1998). 
186 See Frenkel, supra note 72, at 533. 
187 Under the Berne Convention, each member state extends to nationals 
of other member states the same copyright protection that it provides its own 
nationals. Additionally, Berne requires each member state’s copyright laws to 
meet certain minimal requirements. See Hagin, supra note 12, at 369. 
188 See Bharathi, supra note 30, at 1676. 
189 In the United Kingdom, a garment design will be protected as long as 
it can be related back to a copyright drawing. See Schmidt, supra note 7, at 
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But works that are protected in Europe do not receive the same 
protection against design piracy when they are shown in the 
United States.190 Thus, when European designers show their 
works in the United States they are risking that the works may be 
copied and reproduced for sale.191 In fact in the United States the 
copier is even allowed to use the original designer’s name in the 
advertisement to increase sales.192 Congress should look to 
countries such as France and the United Kingdom, which provide 
copyright protection to garment designs, as models and similarly 
extend copyright protection to industrial designs.193 
B. The Garment Design Protection Act 
To extend copyright protection specifically to apparel 
designs, Congress should amend Title 17 of the U.S. Code with a 
new chapter, The Garment Design Protection Act of 2002.194 The 
procedural provisions should follow those laid out in 
Representative Moorhead’s and Representative Kastenmeier’s 
version of the Design Protection Act of 1989, which was 
intended to protect industrial designs.195 
                                                          
n.94, (citing 3 EUR. INTELL. P. REV. 163 (1981)). Under French Law, 
garment designs are protected as applied art or non-functional designs and 
patterns. Designs may be protected upon a showing of public popularity, even 
if there is no evidence of originality. See Schmidt, supra note 7, at n.94 
(citing Dalloz, Jurisprudence Generale, at Propiete Litteraire et Artistique and 
Dessins et Modeles (1952)). 
190 See Bharathi, supra note 30, at 1676. 
191 See Mencken, supra note 9, at n.4 (citing Societe Yves Saint Laurent 
Couture v. Societe Louis Dreyfus Retail Mgmt., [1994] ECC 512, 18 May 
1994, (Paris) (“The French court ruled in favor of Yves Saint Laurent for 
‘counterfeiting and disloyal competition’ against Ralph Lauren for copying a 
black tuxedo dress that was created in 1966. Saint Laurent was awarded 
$395,000 in 1994.”); PARADISE, supra note 6, at 77. 
192 See Mencken, supra note 9, at n.73 (stating that a copier may mark his 
clothing as being “inspired” or “copied” from a certain designer without fear 
of trademark infringement or false advertising). 
193 See discussion supra note 189. 
194 See infra Appendix. 
195 See H.R. Rep. No. 3499, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989). 
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There are several basic problems with the current copyright 
law as applied to apparel designs. For example, as the Copyright 
Act is written, apparel designs are not defined in § 101.196 
Accordingly, garment designs should be defined in the new 
chapter as “the design of a garment, including the cut of the 
fabric and the overall appearance and not including the fabric 
design.”197 For purposes of the Garment Design Protection Act, 
an article should be deemed a “useful article” if the intrinsic 
utilitarian function exceeds the garment’s intention to portray the 
appearance of the article or to convey information. To determine 
an article’s usefulness, considerations should include the cut of 
the fabric, the style, the length and the garment’s overall 
appearance.198 
An important feature of the Garment Design Protection Act 
would be the establishment of a new office, the United States 
Garment Design Protection Office (“GDPO”).199 The GDPO 
would handle all the administrative functions and duties required 
by the act, so as to not overburden the Copyright Office. The 
administrator of the GDPO would have the responsibility of 
carrying out and delegating all official duties of the GDPO. The 
administrator and the subordinate officers and employees of the 
GDPO would be appointed by the Librarian of Congress and 
would act under the librarian’s general direction and supervision. 
Furthermore, the administrator and all the subordinate 
officers who would determine whether garments are entitled to 
protection would be required to have a sufficient knowledge of 
apparel design and would have to pass a vigorous examination, 
just as patent office employees are required to have a scientific 
background and pass the patent bar exam. GDPO employees 
would receive the registration fees required to apply for garment 
design protection.200 
Additionally, A new standard of originality tailored to the 
                                                          
196 17 U.S.C. §101 (2000). 
197 See infra Appendix § 1(a)(2). 
198 See infra Appendix § 1. 
199 See infra Appendix § 7. 
200 See infra Appendix § 8. 
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fashion industry is necessary to protect apparel designs.201 The 
standard should not be high. A low originality threshold is 
necessary because “the fickle nature of fashion requires that 
protection be keyed to what a designer succeeds in making 
currently stylish.”202 
To demonstrate originality, a designer would be required to 
show that his or her apparel design is not a copy of another’s 
work by showing that the design is not currently registered with 
the GDPO. To encourage designers to register their works, a 
piracy claim could not be brought on behalf of an unregistered 
work. “Upon such a showing and in return for creating (or re-
creating) public interest, and a current market for the design, 
copyright protection would issue.”203 Unlike with patents, prior 
works would not have to be submitted to the GDPO. Because the 
decision-makers at the GDPO would have a substantial 
background in apparel design, they would be able to make 
educated decisions about whether the designs meet the originality 
standard. The administrator would consider the garment as a 
whole; only those garments exhibiting creativity would be 
protected, while purely functional, uncreative, “two-sleeves-and-
a-body” designs would be denied protection.204 The 
administrator’s preliminary originality and functionality 
determination could be contested by an accused design pirate in 
an infringement action.205 
Once a design is approved for protection by the GDPO, 
                                                          
201 See Schmidt, supra note 7, at 876. 
202 See id. at n.112: 
Almost no garment design can ever really be considered “brand 
new”: garment designs generally consist of elements already 
“discovered.” “Old” elements are incorporated either in a new 
combination or at a time when such elements are not generally in 
vogue. Often, then, the appeal of garment designs lies solely in the 
re-creation of public interest in a design from the past. 
See id. at n.105. 
203 See id. at 876. 
204 See id. at 877. 
205 See Hagin, supra note 12, at 378 (citing 136 Cong. Rec. E259, E260 
(daily ed. Feb. 7, 1990) (statement of Rep. Kastenmeier)). 
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notice would have to be given. Notice should consist of the 
words “Protected Design” or the letter “F” within a circle, the 
year of the date on which protection for the design commenced 
and the name of the proprietor.206 The notice would be located 
and applied so as to give reasonable notice of design protection 
while the garment is passing through its normal channels of 
commerce. Tags affixed to the garment would fulfill this 
requirement.207 
If a designer knowingly attempts to deceive the public by 
giving false notice, he or she would be fined up to $500 for every 
offense. Any person could sue for the penalty, and in such event, 
one-half of the fees would go to the person suing and the other to 
the GDPO.208 
Another basic problem with the current copyright law 
protection as applied to apparel designs is that the period of 
copyright protection—the author’s life plus seventy years209—is 
inappropriate in view of the “seasonal and capricious nature of 
fashion and consumer tastes.”210 As Rocky Schmidt has 
advocated previously,211 a one-year term should be implemented 
to provide a reasonable time period for designers to make a profit 
on their designs. Since most trends go out of style after three 
months,212 this time period should suffice.213 
The shortened term of protection would serve several 
purposes. First, it would align copyright protection with the 
fickle nature of the industry.214 Second, a shortened term would 
encourage courts to find infringement without fear that such a 
finding would be tantamount to granting a long monopoly in the 
                                                          
206 See infra Appendix § 9(a). 
207 See infra Appendix § 9. 
208 See infra Appendix § 16. 
209 The life of the author plus a seventy year period applies to works 
created on or after January 1, 1978. 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2000). 
210 Wm. Filene’s Sons Co. v. Fashion Originator’s Guild of Am., 90 
F.2d 556, 558 (1st Cir. 1937). 
211 See Schmidt, supra note 7, at 877. 
212 See id. 
213 See infra Appendix § 5. 
214 See Schmidt, supra note 7, at 877. 
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design.215 Third, “a one-year term should provide enough time 
for most designers to recover substantial ‘rewards’ for their 
creations.”216 Finally, the designer would be more likely to apply 
for protection if he or she believed that the courts would 
effectively enforce the law.217 
To ensure that the GDPO does not violate the Sherman Act, 
as did the Fashion Originator’s Guild of America, this article 
proposes, as has Rocky Schmidt, that a compulsory licensing 
system218 be designed to limit the risk of monopolies.219 Upon 
registering a design, the designer would own the design 
exclusively for one month; however, upon publishing, selling, or 
showing the design in public, the designer would be required to 
license it. The license fee arrangement would be similar to that of 
the blanket licenses for sound recordings used by the American 
Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers (“ASCAP”) and 
Broadcast Music, Inc. (“BMI”),220 which the Supreme Court has 
found not violative of the Sherman Act.221 
The GDPO would control the collection and distribution of 
the licensing fees, as well as police the stores, the Internet, 
magazines, and all other possible clothing distribution arenas to 
                                                          
215 See id. 
216 See id. 
217 Peter D. Aufrichtig, Protection for Computer Programs, 32 
COPYRIGHT L. SYMP. (ASCAP) 133, 174-75 (1986). 
218 Under a compulsory licensing system, “once a designer ma[kes] his 
designs public, the world would be free to copy them. [However,] the copyist 
would be required to pay a small royalty or ‘license fee’ to the original 
designer.” See Schmidt, supra note 7, at 878. 
219 See infra Appendix § 6. 
220 ASCAP and BMI issue blanket licenses to copyrighted musical 
compositions for a fee. “Blanket licenses give the licensees the right to 
perform any and all of the compositions owned by the members or affiliates as 
often as the licensees desire for a stated term.” Broadcast Music, Inc. v. 
Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 1 (1979). 
221 Broadcast Music, Inc., 441 U.S. at 19 (holding that “[a]lthough the 
copyright laws confer no rights on copyright owners to fix prices among 
themselves or otherwise violate the antitrust laws, we would not expect that 
any market arrangements reasonably necessary to effectuate the rights that are 
granted would be deemed a per se violation of the Sherman Act”). 
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ensure that no copied material is being sold or displayed without 
payment of the requisite licensing fees. “The compulsory royalty 
system could . . . be converted into a system whereby licensing 
fees fund a ‘pool’ used to bring enforcement actions and police 
the use of designs.”222 A small percentage of the licensing fees 
would go to the GDPO.223 
If the GDPO, or another party, believes that a copier has 
infringed a protected apparel design, the GDPO would notify the 
designer. First, the designer may request a hearing in front of the 
GDPO’s Anti-Piracy Panel (“APP”), which would hear 
infringement claims. The APP would consist of lawyers trained 
in intellectual property law.224 Thereafter, either party could 
appeal the APP’s decision by bringing a civil action in district 
court. 
When an infringement action is brought before the APP, the 
alleged infringer could pay the applicable licensing fees to avoid 
liability. If he or she refuses, the proprietor of the design could 
then seek a preliminary injunction in court; however, the APP 
would not have the authority to grant such an order. At this 
point, the court could appoint a member of the APP to serve as a 
court-appointed master.225 The master would determine 
preliminarily whether infringement had occurred. If the master 
determined that infringement had occurred, the court could enjoin 
the alleged infringing party from further sales of the offending 
apparel until final resolution of the case. If the master finds 
preliminarily that infringement did not occur, the copyright 
holder could, of course, proceed with the litigation in front of the 
APP, but without an injunction preventing the other party from 
manufacturing or selling the allegedly pirated apparel.226 The 
                                                          
222 Hagin, supra note 12, at 384 (citing Schmidt, supra note 7, at 879 
n.136).  
223 See infra Appendix § 8(d). 
224 See infra Appendix § 7(c). 
225 It is well within the court’s power to provide for a master to make 
determinations of fact in areas that are outside of the court’s expertise. See 
Aufrichtig, supra note 217, at 176-77 (citing Wisconsin v. Illinois, 449 U.S. 
48 (1980)). See infra Appendix § 14(b)(2). 
226 See Aufrichtig, supra note 217, at 176-77. 
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parties also could resolve the matter by arbitration.227 
As in all copyright infringement actions, it would not be 
infringement to make, have made, import, sell, or distribute any 
article embodying a garment design created without knowledge of 
a protected garment design.228 After proving that he or she is 
innocent, the accused infringer would be permitted to sell the 
remainder of his or her merchandise and either cease sales or pay 
the licensing fees. 
Whenever the alleged infringer introduces an earlier design 
that is identical or substantially similar to the protected design, 
the party alleging infringement would have the burden of 
affirmatively establishing its originality.229 After originality is 
established, the degree of similarity between the protected design 
and the alleged infringing design would be evaluated. 
In evaluating whether infringement had occurred, the master 
would consider a number of factors. First, he or she would have 
to determine whether the allegedly infringing design is an exact 
copy of the protected design.230 If it were not, the master would 
determine whether significant stylistic features of the original 
garment are found in the second. If so, the master would 
compare the cut, sleeve and garment length, collar or waist, fit, 
and other similar features of the garments. The fabric design and 
necessary accessories, such as zippers and buttons, should not be 
included in this preliminary evaluation. The final preliminary test 
would be a comparison of the overall look and style of the two 
garments. If the master believes that, based on the foregoing, 
there is a basis for infringement, he or she should so advise the 
court and specify his or her reasoning. If the master does not find 
enough similarity to warrant a finding of likely infringement, he 
or she should indicate the degree of similarity found.231 
Should the case proceed to trial before the APP, after the 
court has either granted or denied the preliminary injunction, 
                                                          
227 See infra Appendix § 14(c). 
228 See infra Appendix § 11. 
229 See infra Appendix § 11. 
230 An exact copy would violate infra Appendix §11(d). 
231 See Aufrichtig, supra note 217, at 180. 
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both parties should provide all supporting documents, including 
any design drawings, relating to the development of the 
respective garment designs.232 The parties also should provide 
documents tending to substantiate the period of time involved in 
developing and manufacturing the garment. Testimony of other 
employees who took part in designing the garment would be 
admissible as well. This could provide circumstantial evidence of 
the defendant’s independent effort.233 
The master’s preliminary evaluation should play a substantial 
role in the APP’s and the court’s analysis, should the case be 
appealed.234 If the master finds that the defendant developed a 
substantially similar garment in a suspiciously short period of 
time, or soon after the plaintiff first showed the design (either 
publicly or at a private show), the APP should find copyright 
infringement.235 Of course, evidence that the design was copied 
from a prior work by a third party would be a valid defense.236 
A prevailing plaintiff could be awarded the infringer’s profits 
resulting from the sale of the copies if it is found that the 
infringer’s sales are reasonably related to the use of the 
claimant’s design.237 In such a case, the plaintiff would only be 
required to prove the infringer’s sales, and the infringer would be 
required to prove his or her expenses against such sales. In any 
action, the APP may, in its discretion, allow for the recovery of 
full costs by or against any party other than the United States or 
an officer thereof.238 The APP also may award reasonable 
attorneys’ fees to the prevailing party as part of the costs.239 
Additionally, the APP may award punitive damages as it sees 
fit.240 Finally, the APP may order that all infringing articles and 
                                                          
232 See id. at 181. 
233 See id. at 180. 
234 See id. 
235 See id. 
236 See id. 
237 See id. 
238 See id. 
239 See id. 
240 See infra Appendix § 15(c). 
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any patterns, models, or other means specifically adapted for 
making the infringed garment be delivered for destruction or 
other disposition, as the APP may direct.241 
To date, the Copyright Office, the courts and Congress have 
feared (not without reason) that if apparel designs receive 
copyright protection, other industrial designers would demand 
similar protection; they fear the formation of monopolies, which 
will cause prices to soar.242 However, implementation of a 
licensing scheme should allay this fear.243 Although Congressman 
Kastenmeir suggests that “the argument that a particular interest 
group will make more money and therefore be more creative 
does not satisfy this threshold standard or the constitutional 
requirements of the intellectual property clause,”244 copyright 
protection for original apparel designs would benefit the economy 
and consumers as well as designers.245 As Ralph Brown has 
stated, “[W]hen one places the case for limited protection for the 
ornamental design of useful objects in the context of other limited 
monopolies in intellectual property, the case is not an 
unreasonable one.”246 
                                                          
241 See infra Appendix § 15. 
242 Brown, Copyright-like Protection, supra note 91, at 323. 
243 A licensing scheme, such as the one discussed in this note, would 
greatly reduce the threat of monopolies; designers would be willing to license 
their designs for royalties or a fixed fee. See Hagin, supra note 12, at 386. 
This would keep the cost of licensed imitations relatively low, and consumers 
would still be able to get designer look-a-likes at cheaper prices. 
244 Brown, Copyright-like Protection, supra note 91, at 323. 
245 A federal law would give the courts a bright-line rule when deciding 
apparel design cases, thus providing more consistency for future decisions. In 
addition, designers who are afforded protection for their creations would be 
assured greater profits, and, in turn, would be likely to create more designs. 
Bharathi, supra note 30, at 1670. This would not only increase domestic 
revenue for the United States, but revenue abroad as well. Id. at 1669-70. 
Protection for apparel designs would also increase competition because the 
imitators would begin to create their own original designs. 
246 Brown, Copyright-like Protection, supra note 91, at 323. 
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CONCLUSION 
Extending copyright law to afford protection for apparel 
designs would benefit society, designers and consumers.247 
Apparel designs are no longer merely utilitarian in nature, rather 
designers must “creat[e] art to fit the framework of the human 
form [that] often involves creativity (e.g., movement, fluidity), 
and [demands that the designer] create within the confines of 
wearability.”248 Copyright law needs to adapt to changes in 
society because “copyright protection for fashion works is crucial 
to competitiveness.”249 The current copyright law should be 
adapted to protect apparel designs, and the “proposed amendment 
better comports with equitable and competitive norms than does 
current copyright doctrine applied to this area.”250 The works of 
fashion designers should be protected because protecting original 
designs would rid the U.S. apparel industry of free-riders, thus 
creating a truly level playing field—the very essence of fair 
competition.251 
                                                          
247 Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219. “[The] encouragement of 
individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public 
welfare . . . . Sacrificial days devoted to such creative activities deserve 
rewards commensurate with the services rendered.” Id. 
248 See Hagin, supra note 12, at 354. 
249 See id. at 387. 
250 See id. 
251 See Brown, Copyright and Its Upstart Cousins: Privacy, Publicity, 
Unfair Competition, 33 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y 301, 313-20 (1986). 
NURBHAIMACRO4-29.DOC 7/24/02  11:30 AM 
 STYLE PIRACY REVISITED 525 
Appendix A 
United States Code: Title 17 
Other Provisions 
A Proposed Bill for the Protection of Apparel Designs 
To strengthen the intellectual property laws of the United 
States by providing protection for original apparel designs 
against unauthorized copying. 
Section 1. Designs Protected 
(a) Designs protected. 
(1) In general. The designer or other owner of an 
original design of a useful article, which makes the 
article attractive or distinctive in appearance to the 
purchasing or using public, may secure the protection 
provided by this Act upon complying with and subject 
to this Act. 
(2) Apparel Designs (also referred to as Garment 
Designs). The design of a garment, including the cut 
of the fabric and the overall appearance, and not 
including the fabric design, is subject to protection 
under this Act, notwithstanding Section 2(d). 
(b) Definitions. For the purpose of this Act, the following 
terms have the following meanings: 
(1) A design is “original” if it is the result of the 
designer’s creative endeavor that provides a 
distinguishable variation over prior work pertaining to 
similar articles, which is more than merely trivial and 
has not been copied from another source. In 
determining originality, considerations should include 
but not be limited to the cut of the fabric, the style, 
the length and the garment’s overall appearance.   
(2) A “useful article” is a garment design that in 
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normal use has an intrinsic utilitarian function 
exceeding the intention to portray the article or to 
convey information or an article that is solely useful. 
(3) The “design of a useful article,” hereinafter 
referred to as a “design,” consists of those aspects or 
elements of the article, including its three-dimensional 
features of shape, that make up the appearance of the 
article. The design must be fixed in a useful article to 
be protectable under this Act. 
Section 2. Designs Not Subject to Protection 
Protection under this Act shall not be available for a design 
that is— 
(a) not original; 
(b) staple or commonplace, such as standard geometric 
figures, familiar symbols, emblems, or motifs; or other 
shapes, patterns, or configurations that have become 
common, prevalent, or ordinary; 
(c) different from a design excluded by Subsection (b) 
above, only in insignificant details or in elements which 
are variants commonly used in the relevant trades; or 
(d) dictated solely by a utilitarian function of the article 
that embodies it. 
Section 3. Revisions, Adaptations, and Rearrangements 
Protection under this Act shall be available 
notwithstanding Subsections 2(b) through (d), if the 
design is a substantial revision, adaptation, or 
rearrangement of said subject matter. Such protection 
shall be independent of any subsisting protection in 
subject matter employed in the design, and shall not be 
construed as securing any right to subject matter excluded 
from protection under this Act or as extending any 
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subsisting protection under this Act. 
Section 4. Commencement of Protection 
The protection provided for a design under this Act shall 
commence upon the date of publication of the registration 
pursuant to Section 13(a), or the date the design is first 
publicly exhibited anywhere in the world, whichever 
occurs first. 
Section 5. Term of Protection 
(a) In general. Subject to Subsection (b) and the 
provisions of this Act, the protection herein provided for 
a design shall continue for a term of one year from the 
date of the commencement of protection as provided in 
Section 4. 
(b) Upon expiration or termination of protection in a 
particular design, as provided in this Act, all rights under 
this Act in said design shall terminate, regardless of the 
number of different articles in which the design may have 
been utilized during the term of its protection. 
Section 6. Ownership, Transfer, and Licensing 
(a) The exclusive rights in an apparel design subject to 
protection under this Act belong to the registrant of the 
apparel design. 
(b) The owner shall retain exclusive rights in the design 
for the period of one month after registration. After said 
time has expired, the owner must license the design rights 
to any qualified requesting retailer or licensee. Such rights 
may be licensed by operation of law, may be bequeathed 
by will, and may pass as personal property by the 
applicable laws of intestate succession. 
(c) Any document pertaining to an apparel design may be 
recorded in the United States Garment Design Protection 
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Office (“GDPO”) if the document filed for recordation 
bears the actual signature of the person who executed it or 
if it is accompanied by a sworn or official certification 
that it is a true copy of the original, signed document. The 
Administrator of the GDPO (the “Administrator”) shall, 
upon receipt of the document and the fee specified by the 
Administrator, record the document and return it with a 
certificate of recordation. The recordation of any license 
under this paragraph gives all persons constructive notice 
of the facts stated in the recorded document concerning 
the transfer or license. 
(1) The GDPO shall be responsible for making sure 
that copies are being sold only by those retailers who 
have paid the licensing fees to copy the particular 
apparel designs. Those retailers who are found to be 
selling a garment that is substantially similar to a 
protected design will be subject to an infringement 
action as specified by Section 11 of this Act. 
Section 7. The Garment Design Protection Office 
Responsibilities, and Organization 
(a) All administrative functions and duties under this Act, 
except as otherwise specified, are the responsibility of the 
Administrator. The Administrator, together with the 
subordinate officers and employees of the GDPO, shall be 
appointed by the Librarian of Congress and shall act 
under the Librarian’s general direction and supervision. 
The Administrator and all subordinate officers who make 
decisions about which garments shall receive protection, 
must have a sufficient understanding of past and present 
apparel designs, and must pass a vigorous examination 
given by the Administrator. 
(b) In addition to the functions and duties set out 
elsewhere in this Act, the GDPO shall perform the 
following functions: 
(1) Effectively decide which garments meet the 
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requirements necessary to receive copyright protection 
pursuant to this Act and control the registration 
process for protectable garments; 
(2) Control the collection and distribution of the 
licensing fees; 
(3) Police stores, the internet, magazines, and all other 
possible clothing distribution arenas to ensure that no 
copied material is being sold or displayed without a 
valid license. 
(c) The GDPO shall have a separate department, the Anti-
Piracy Panel (“APP”), that shall hear and decide claims 
of infringement. This department shall consist of lawyers 
trained in the area of intellectual property. If a party 
wishes to appeal the APP’s decision, the case shall be 
brought to an appropriate court of jurisdiction. 
Section 8. Garment Design Protection Office Fees 
(a) The Administrator shall, by regulation, set reasonable 
fees for the filing of applications to register designs under 
this Act, taking into consideration the cost of providing 
these services. 
(b) The Administrator shall, by regulation, set reasonable 
fees for the licensing of protected apparel designs. 
(c) The employees of the Garment Design Protection 
Office shall be paid with the monies received through the 
registration process. 
(d) A reasonable percentage of the licensing fees, the 
amount of which is to be determined by the 
Administrator, will be set aside for the compensation of 
the GDPO employees. 
Section 9. Design Notice 
(a) Whenever any design for which protection is sought 
under this Act is publicly exhibited, as provided in 
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Section 12(b), the proprietor shall, subject to the 
provisions of Section 12, mark the design or have the 
design marked legibly with a design notice consisting of 
the following three elements (the “Design Notice”): 
(1) the words “Protected Design” or the letter “F” 
within a circle; 
(2) The year of the date on which protection for the 
design commenced; and 
(3) The name of the proprietor, an abbreviation by 
which the name can be recognized, or a generally 
accepted alternative designation of the proprietor; any 
distinctive identification of the proprietor may be used 
if it has been approved and recorded by the 
Administrator before the design marked with such 
identification is registered.  
After registration, the registration number may be used 
instead of the elements specified in (2) and (3) hereof. 
(b) The Design Notice shall be so located and applied as 
to give reasonable notice of design protection while the 
garment is passing through its normal channels of 
commerce. This requirement may be fulfilled through use 
of tags affixed to the material. 
(c) When the proprietor of a design has complied with the 
provisions of this Section, protection under this Act shall 
not be affected by the removal, destruction, or 
obliteration by others of the Design Notice on an article. 
Section 10. Effect of Omission of Design Notice 
The omission of the Design Notice prescribed in Section 9 
shall not cause loss of protection, but damages or profits 
shall not be recoverable under the provisions of this Act 
in any action for infringement, with the exception of 
actual proof that the infringer was notified of the design 
protection and continued to infringe thereafter, in which 
event damages or profits may be recovered only for 
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infringement after such notice. 
Section 11. Infringement 
(a) It shall be infringement of a design protected under 
this Act for any person, without the consent of the 
proprietor of the design, by conduct in or affecting 
commerce during the term of such protection, to— 
(1) make, have made or import, for sale or for use in 
trade, any infringing article as defined in Subsection 
(d) hereof; or 
(2) sell or distribute for sale or use in trade any such 
infringing article, provided that a seller or distributor 
of any such article who did not make or import the 
same shall be deemed to be an infringer if— 
(i) he or she induces, or acts in collusion with a 
manufacturer to make, or an importer to import 
such article (merely purchasing or giving an order 
to purchase in the ordinary course of business shall 
not itself constitute such inducement or collusion); 
or 
(ii) he or she refuses, or fails upon the request of 
the proprietor of the design, to make a prompt and 
full disclosure of his or her source of such article, 
and he or she orders or reorders such article after 
having received notice by registered or certified 
mail of the protection subsisting in the design. 
(b) It shall not be infringement to make, have made, 
import, sell, or distribute, any article embodying an 
apparel design created without knowledge of a protected 
apparel design. 
(c) A person who incorporates into his or her own product 
of manufacture an infringing article acquired from others 
in the ordinary course of business or who, without 
knowledge of the protected design, makes or processes an 
infringing article for the account of another person in the 
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ordinary course of business shall not be deemed an 
infringer except under the conditions of clauses (i) and (ii) 
of Subsection (a)(2) of this Section. Accepting an order or 
reorder from the source of the infringing article shall be 
deemed ordering or reordering within the meaning of 
Clause (ii) of Subsection (a)(2) of this Section. 
(d) An “infringing article” as used herein is any article, 
the design of which has been copied from, and is 
substantially similar to, the protected design without the 
consent of the proprietor, provided that an illustration or 
picture of a protected design in an advertisement, book, 
periodical, newspaper, photograph, broadcast, motion 
picture or similar medium shall not be deemed to be an 
infringing article. An article is not an infringing article if 
it embodies, in common with the protected design, only 
elements described in Subsections (a) through (d) of 
Section 2. 
(e) The party alleging rights in any action or proceeding 
concerning an apparel design shall have the burden of 
affirmatively establishing its originality whenever the 
opposing party introduces an earlier work, which is 
identical to such design, or so similar as to make a prima 
facie showing that such design was copied from such 
work. 
Section 12. Application for Registration 
(a) Protection under this Act shall be lost if application for 
registration of the design is not made within one month 
after the date on which the design was first made public. 
(b) A design is made public, either by the designer or 
with his or her consent, when an existing useful article 
embodying the design is anywhere publicly exhibited, 
publicly distributed or offered for sale or sold to the 
public. 
(c) Application for registration may be made by the 
designer and shall contain such information as required by 
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the GDPO. 
(d) The application for registration shall be accompanied 
by a drawing or other pictorial representation of the useful 
article having one or more views, adequately displaying 
the design in a form and style suitable for reproduction 
and shall be accompanied by the prescribed fee. 
(e) More than one design may be included in the same 
application under such conditions as may be prescribed by 
the Administrator. For each design included in an 
application the fee prescribed for a single design shall be 
paid. 
Section 13. Certification of Registration 
Certificates of registration shall be issued in the name of 
the United States under the seal of the Office of the 
Administrator and shall be recorded in the official records 
of the Office. The certificate shall state the name of the 
useful article, the date of filing of the application, the date 
of registration and the date the design was made public, if 
earlier than the date of filing of the application, and shall 
contain a reproduction of the drawing or other pictorial 
representation of the design. If a description of the salient 
features of the design appears in the application, the 
description shall also appear in the certificate. A 
certificate of registration shall be admitted in any court as 
prima facie evidence of the facts stated in the certificate. 
Section 14. Remedy for Infringement 
(a) The proprietor of a design shall have remedy for 
infringement by means of a hearing in front of the APP. 
Parties may appeal by bringing a civil action in front of 
the U.S. district courts or any other court of appropriate 
jurisdiction. 
(b) At the time an infringement action is brought, the 
alleged infringer may pay the applicable licensing fees to 
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avoid an action. If this option is refused, the designer of 
the protected design may attempt to get a preliminary 
injunction. 
(1) Any court having jurisdiction under this Act may, 
in its discretion, grant injunctions in accordance with 
the principles of equity to prevent infringement, 
including prompt relief through temporary restraining 
orders and preliminary injunctions. 
(2) The Courts may appoint a master from the APP to 
make a preliminary decision about whether the design 
is likely to infringe. If the master finds the design is 
likely to infringe, the court can enjoin the alleged 
infringing party from further sales of the offending 
design until resolution of the case. If the master finds 
the design is not likely to infringe, the copyright 
holder may proceed with the litigation but without a 
preliminary injunction preventing the other party from 
manufacturing or selling the allegedly pirated apparel. 
(c) The parties to an infringement dispute under this Act, 
within such time as may be specified by the Administrator 
by regulation, may determine such contest or any aspect 
thereof by arbitration. Such arbitration shall be governed 
by the provision of title 9, United States Code, to the 
extent such title is not inconsistent with this Section. The 
parties shall give notice of any arbitration award to the 
Administrator, and such award shall, as between the 
parties to the arbitration, be dispositive of the issues to 
which it relates. The arbitration award shall be 
unenforceable until such notice is given. Nothing in this 
Subsection shall preclude the Administrator from 
determining whether a design is subject to registration in a 
cancellation proceeding pursuant to this Act. 
Section 15. Recovery for Infringement 
(a) The claimant may be awarded the infringer’s profits 
resulting from the sale of the copies if it is found that the 
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infringer’s sales are reasonably related to the use of the 
claimant’s design. In such a case, the claimant shall be 
required to prove only the infringer’s sales and the 
infringer shall be required to prove its expenses against 
such sales. 
(b) In any action under this Act, the APP, in its 
discretion, may allow the recovery of full costs by or 
against any party other than the United States or an officer 
thereof. The APP may also award reasonable attorney’s 
fees to the prevailing party as part of the costs. 
(c) The APP may award punitive damages to the 
prevailing party as it sees fit. 
(d) The APP may order that all infringing articles, and 
any patterns, models or other means specifically adapted 
for making the same be delivered up for the destruction or 
other disposition as the APP may direct. 
Section 16. Penalty for False Marking 
(a) Whoever, for the purpose of deceiving the public, 
marks upon, or applies to, or uses in advertising in 
connection with any article made, used, distributed, or 
sold, the design of which is not protected under this Act, 
a Design Notice as specified in Section 9 or any other 
words or symbols importing that the design is protected 
under this Act, knowing that the design is not so 
protected, shall be fined not more than $500 for every 
such offense. 
(b) Any person may sue for the penalty, in which event, 
one-half shall go to the person suing and the other to the 
use of the GDPO. 
Section 17. Relation to Other Laws 
Nothing in this Act shall affect any right or remedy held 
by any person under chapters 1 through 9 of title 17, or 
under title 35 of the United States Code, or under any 
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common law, unfair competition law, trademark law or 
other rights or remedies, if any, available to or held by 
any person with respect to a design whether or not 
registered under this Act. 
Section 18. Liability for Action on Registration Fraudulently 
Obtained 
Any person who brings an action for infringement 
knowing that registration of the design is obtained by a 
false or fraudulent representation materially affecting the 
rights under this Act shall be liable in the sum of 
$1,000.00, or such part thereof as the court may 
determine, as compensation to the defendant, to be 
charged against the plaintiff and paid to the defendant, in 
addition to such costs and attorney’s fees of the defendant 
as may be assessed by the court. 
Section 19. Severability Clause 
If any provision of this Act or the application of such 
provision to any person or circumstance is held invalid, 
the remainder of the Act or the application to other 
persons or circumstances shall not be affected thereby. 
Section 20. Time of Taking Effect 
This Act shall take effect immediately after enactment. 
Section 21. No Retroactive Effect 
Protection under this Act shall not be available for any 
design that has been commercially exploited as provided 
in Section 11(b) prior to the effective date of this Act. 
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Section 22. Short Title 
This Act may be cited as “The Garment Design Protection 
Act of 2002”. 
 
